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Possible Future Trends in Government Expenditure
IN this study, we have tried to present the statistics of British government
expenditure in a fashion that might be of value in the study of public
expenditures in other countries or during other periods. We are conscious
that the structure we offer does not have the formal symmetry or analytical
rigor that might be obtained, for instance, by use of welfare economics.
But, as we have pointed out, welfare analysis applied to the problems of
government economic activity involves highly unrealistic assumptions
about the nature of the aims of governments and consequently is of
negligible value as a means of explaining the facts of history. We would
claim for our approach that any sacrifice of rigor is more than com-
pensated by the realism it makes possible, and indeed that flexibility is
essential for any approach that is to be of value outside the immediate
context of one country or period. We do not wish to establish a new "law,"
but we do hope to have evolved a method that will be of use to others
interested in similar problems. At the same time, we believe our approach
is not restricted to the interpretation of history. It can also contribute to
our understanding of the processes that determine the size and character
of public spending, and hence interest those whose concern is with eco-
nomic policy and with the development of the public sector in the future.
At first sight, the last claim may seem implausible. We have placed
great emphasis in earlier chapters upon the operation of the displacement
effect and the concentration process. Our general argument would
therefore seem to suggest that forecasting the future of public expenditures
requires prediction of the dates of future wars or other social upheavals.
But the policy maker and the student of economic policy cannot abdicate
their task because they do not know whether or when there will be a
war or an earthquake. They must postulate such an occurrence, or its
absence. And it is within this context that our approach is relevant; it
can help us make projections of public expenditure of a kind that provide
information about the broad range of possibilities that are likely to face
the government, and about the relation between these and the possible
evolution of particular kinds of public spending, in the absence of major
social disturbances.
The contribution of our study to projection problems has two aspects,
one general and the other specific. The general contribution concerns
the use we have made of the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation.
if we assume that there will be no social disturbances during the period
for which a projection is made, then our earlier argument and the
historical evidence would suggest that we might expect to find some broad
relation between the growth of community wealth (GNP) and the size
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of the total taxes that the government might feel itself able to raise. We
do not suggest that the relation is a very precise one; it depends, for
example, upon the form taken by people's views about tax burdens, and
upon such things as the nature of the tax structure. For example, a
progressive income tax and surtax will produce a tax yield that grows
faster than money GNP, with constant tax rates. This may or may not
be accepted by the community, depending upon whether those who
find growing proportions of their real income being taken in tax are
stimulated to protest. But while such matters affect the precise relation
over time between GNP and government revenues, they are unlikely to
be important enough to make it pointless to use the broad constancy of
that relation as an indicator of the potential scope for public spending.
The second, and specific, contribution is more directly concerned with
expenditures. Our historical study has provided us with information
about the development of public spending for particular purposes, and
there seems no reason why this material and method of classification
should not be used as the basis for statistical speculation about future
possibilities. Thus we can make explicit assumptions as to the evolution
of particular groups o? expenditures, and show what would happen to
public spending over the period under review on the basis of those
Essumptions. Many of the difficulties that we have encountered in
offering an expost facto explanationof the development of government
activities will be found to be equally relevant to the problem of analysing
future growth.
Both of these procedures, of course, are intended to do no more than
give an indication of possibilities of a kind that might inform discussion;
we cannot emphasize too strongly that we do not believe ourselves to
be forecasting what British Government expenditures are actually going
to be in the future. With this proviso, the most interesting method of
presenting the projection would seem to be first to derive expenditure
estimates directly, for groups of services and on defined assumptions, and
then to see how the totals compare with the scope for expenditure that
GNP estimates suggest to be likely.
In the next section, then, we offer a projection of government expendi-
ture for years up to 1981, and a detailed explanation of the specific
assumptions on which it is based. The projection is limited to the mag-
nitude and broad composition of current government expenditure,
excluding nationalized industries. It is not offered as a prophecy, but
rather as a means of narrowing the discussion of public expenditures and
directing attention to the issues of significance for policy purposes.' We
1Ifwe appear to labor this point, the experience of others who have made similar
projections justifies that emphasis. How often must Nicholas Kaldor (Appendix C in
[footnote continued on page 136']
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start out from the fundamental assumption that the period of the pro-
jection will be free from random disturbance by wars or other social
upheavals; we do not concern ourselves, at least in our statistical pro-
jection, with any potential displacement effect. On this basis, we proceed
by dividing up expenditures into three groups (expanding, contracting,
constant), the division being dictated by our historical findings in earlier
chapters, as modified by such specific considerations as seem to us relevant
in respect of individual types of expenditure. Within each group, this
fundamental assumption leaves us free to examine such "permanent"
influences upon expenditure as changes in the size and structure of
population as the possible determinants of the future size and com-
position of government spending.
Our projection is also based upon another general assumption, suffici-
ently important to require careful explanation. This is that there will be
no major changes in public policy affecting the broad general scope of
government spending. The justification for such an assumption is not
simply that there are no policy differences between the major political
parties, though in recent years there has in fact been a wide measure of
agreement about the scope of social services and (to a lesser and decreasing
extent) defense requirements, both of which are important from an
expenditure point of view. Quite as important is the fact that the volume
of "irrevocable" expenditure, at least in money terms, is such that even
radical changes in government policies might take a considerable time to
become effective in their influence on expenditures. A government that
decided to discontinue subsidies to local housing projects, for example,
could hardly stop payment of existing subsidies, to which it might be
committed for as long as sixty years. Indeed, in recent years we have
seen a considerable weakening in Britain of the principle that "no govern-
ment can bind its successor." Postwar governments have introduced
services, notably in the field of national insurance, in respect of which
such officials as the Government Actuary are obliged to make projections
of expenditure for as far ahead as twenty-five years. The planning period
of the education and health programs is no longer identical with the
expected period of office of the government in power. This development,
in our view, makes our general assumption a reasonable one to use as the
basis for our projection.
W. H. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society, London, 1945) have been quoted in
terms that suggest he was making a forecast?
To be quite clear: We do not expect our estimates of particular magnitudes for par-
ticular years to be borne out by events. Other qualifications apart, our assumption of
constant prices would make such an outcome unlikely. Our figures are intended solely
as a means of setting out the important issues and relative magnitudes, and we would
not wish to have them quoted in any other context.
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It may be objected that this assumption prevents us from taking
account of actual plans and proposals that have been made for the
extension of public services and expenditures in particular directions;
influential proposals have been made, for example, for extended public
education and health facilities. We have two answers to this objection.
it is in the nature of political life that there are always in existence
plans for the provision of more and better public services of a wide
variety of kinds. If we assumed that all such plans would be implemented,
and estimated the expenditure involved, we should get a total indicating
a very much more rapid rate of growth than the one given by our actual
projection. But we have discussed the political aspects of expenditure
growth in earlier chapters; it should be enough to say here that, while
we would agree that there has been a weakening in the procedure by
which control over public expenditure has traditionally been exercised
in Britain, we are still far from a position in which governments regard
the growth of such expenditure as a matter of no concern at all: they are
still aware of the need to raise the necessary taxes. This being so, to
proceed simply by adding up the expenditures implied by existing
proposals to extend government services would in our view be quite
unrealistic: no one expects all such proposals to be implemented.
Second, we would refer yet once again to the nature of our exercise.
We are concerned to make a projection, on assumptions that are ex-
plained. We may in the process ignore possibilities of expansion, and so
on, in particular directions that other economists believe to be im-
portant. If so, they can modify our estimates, and perhaps our con-
clusions, accordingly. We shall be satisfied if our statistical exercise can be
used to provide the theme around which others interested can furnish
their own variations.
A Projection of Current Government Expenditure, 1953—81
Table23 presents our projection. All figures are expressed at 1956 prices,
and types of expenditure are classified according to whether they will
expand, remain stationary, or contract.
The method of compilation is most easily explained by considering
the questions that must be answered in order to make such a projection,
and then giving the answers that we have used as the basis for this one—
i.e., the specific technical and assumptions that we have
made. The important questions are concerped with technical coefficients
of production, with the standards of provision of public services, with
changes in the size and composition of population, and with the future
behavior of expenditures for a miscellaneous(but not insignificant)
group of services that do not lend themselves easily to the general method
of treatment adopted for the rest.
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TABLE 23
PR0JEc'rIoN OF TOTAL UNITED KINGDoM GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON
CURRENT ACCOUNT, AT 1956 PRIcEs, SELECTED YEARS, 1953—81
(amounts in millions of pounds; index, 1956 =100)







Education 473 543 557 535 545
National health 584 618 632 664 687
National insurance benefits 618 680 770 928 1,053
Other 589 640 654 688 712
Total 2,264 2,481 2,613 2.815 2,997
Index 83.2 100.0 105.3 113.5 120.8
Contracting
Family allowances 125 116 117 113 115
National assistance 177 165 140 130 120
War pensions 87 84 80 73 55
Agriculture and food subsidies306 254 210 285 185
Other 127 105 100 90 80
Total 822 724 647 591 555
Index 113.5 100.0 89.5 81.6 76.7
Stationary
Defense 1,827 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662
National Debt 738 725 725 725 725
Housing 106 107 107 107 107
Other 155 150 150 150 150
Total 2,826 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644
Total current expenditure 5,912 5,849 5,904 6,050 6,196
Index 100.1 100.0 100.9 103.4 105.9
SOURCE: For 1953 and 1956 statistics, see Blue Book, 1957.
TECHNICAL COEFFICIENTS OF PRODUCTION
To project the future course of government expenditure, we need to
know what itis going to cost at any time to maintain any specified
standard of service for a given number of people. There is no reason why
the cost should remain constant, or why the provision of the same "real"
standard in a particular service for the same number of people in 1956
and in 1981 must involve the same amount of expenditure at constant
1956 prices. As pointed out in Chapter 2, statistical and other difficulties
are created by the fact that relative scarcities of resources can change
over time as a consequence of changes in technical coefficients of pro-
duction and in the character of demand. The significance of these changes
in the present context is that they may change the nature and cost of
the "input mix" needed to produce a service or to increase its output.
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As a result, changes over time in the volume of consumption of a service
may not imply equivalent changes in the amount of expenditure at
constant prices.
These changes in the technical coefficients of production are likely to
be of special interest over periods when the process of technical change
has different significance for the private and the public sector. But the
changes are not easy to predict, for obvious reasons, nor does a projection
of our type lend itself to the use of very complex propositions about them.
It therefore seems best to assume fixed and constant technical coefficients,
so that doubling the amount of a service provided implies doubling the
amount of labor, materials, and so forth, purchased. Put in another way,
the expenditure on a service, if standards of provision remain constant, is
assumed to increase proportionately with the number of individuals for
whom it is provided. This assumption is operationally convenient, but
it will clearly call for further comment when we come to evaluate the
projection in which it is used.
STANDARDS OF SERVICE
The volume of expenditure upon any government service must depend
upon the standard of service to which the government commits itself.
We have assumed for the projection that the standards of service provided
in 1956 will be maintained. At first sight this might seem a simple matter
to define. For transfer payments it is; we need only assume that such
payments as retirement pensions and family allowances will be main-
tained at a level providing constant purchasing power for their recipients.
This procedure involves us in some of the conceptual difficulties already
discussed, but is otherwise unambiguous.
The difficult problems arise in dealing with government services given
in kind rather than money, such as health and education. These provide
a special and extreme case of the problems of technical coefficients and
demand, just explained. What does the maintenance of a given standard
mean in the context of services of this kind? Consider the case of health
expenditures. Maintaining the same standard of service should really be
discussed in terms of maintaining the health of the community as reflected
in such things as mortality and morbidity rates. To try to reflect such a
constant standard in, for example, a constant expenditure at 1956 prices
per qualified individual for each year being studied is a dubious procedure.
Tuberculosis is a good illustration. Twenty-five years ago it was one of
the major causes of death. To-day many tuberculosis hospitals in Britain
are closing down. Thus the real expenditure per individual necessary to
maintain the same "output" of health from this particular point of view
has declined; there is a changed relation between factor input and product
output, in a wide sense of those terms. However, we have no satisfactory
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means of establishing a relationship through time—of a kind that might
be used in our projection—between real expenditures per head and
standards of provision in such services as health and education. For
these two services (the major items of current expenditure for services in
kind), therefore, we must fall back on the formula that maintaining the
1956 standard of service per individual can be equated with maintaining
real expenditure per individual (1956 prices) at the 1956 level. That is,
the fixed coefficients assumption explained above is applied here also.
Some such assumption is unavoidable; we are aware that itis unsatis-
factory and that this will need to be borne in mind when we assess our
results.
A particular problem arises in the case of defense expenditure. Not
only is it difficult, if not impossible, to define what precisely is meant by
maintaining the 1956 standard of defense, but also it is impossible to
attribute the benefits of defense to particular individuals in any meaningful
fashion. Rather than attempt to define defense output and to allocate its
benefits arbitrarily to individuals, we have chosen to adopt the assumption
that defense expenditure remains fixed in real terms at the 1956 level.
Once again, our projection must be interpreted and evaluated in the
light of this procedure.
POPULATION
Given our assumptions about technical coefficients and standards of
provision, the outstanding general determinant of the level of government
expenditure becomes the size and character of the country's population,
upon which itis reasonable to suppose that future expenditures on
economic, environmental, and social services must depend. The problem
thus becomes largely one of projecting future population and of
relating expenditures on the various services to that projection. In
economic and environmental services, we have ignored changes in
population composition, writing up expenditures in proportion to changes
in total population size. This procedure, unsatisfactory even for these
services, would be much more so for the far more important social
services. For these, a more complex procedure makes use of a previous
study, adjustments being made for changes in standards of service since
1952, the year to which that study refers.2 The statistical procedure is
not described in detail here, since itis available in the cited paper.
Essentially, it takes into account the fact that the expected aging of our
2SeeF. W. Paish and A. T. Peacock, "Economics of Dependence, 1952—82," Econ-
omica, November 1954. In this study detailed projections of the size and composition of
population were based on Projection 14 of the Statistics Committee of the Royal Com-
mission on Population. In our present study, we have adopted the projections of the
Registrar General in the Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1957.
140POSSIBLE TRENDS IX GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
population, combined with a very slow rate of population growth, should
bring with it a change in average expenditure on those services per head
of population, because there is good reason to believe that the cost per
head of social services may be higher for the retired population than for
those of working age or for children.
EXPENDITURES REQUIRING DIFFERENT TREATMENT
There remains to be considered the treatment of certain other types
of expenditure that cannot plausibly be assumed to be closely related to
population changes, such as national debt interest, food and agricultural
subsidies, and war pensions. The perplexing problem of debt interest is
that it represents a commitment in money terms and not in real terms.
The problem of projecting price changes so that one could express future
debt interest payments in real terms is difficult enough, but there is
another important factor at work. Even assuming no change in the size
of national debt, conversion operations will be necessary, given the
present structure of the debt. Debt interest payments will depend on
future interest rates. When an earlier projection of government expendi-
ture was made by one of us, it seemed at the time reasonable to assume
that debt interest in real terms would fall.3 Now it seems more satisfactory
to assume a stationary total of debt interest payments in real terms. Like
the previous estimate, this is pure guesswork. It will be recalled that a
similar assumption was made in the case of defense. With food and agri-
cultural subsidies, we have assumed that the remaining food subsidies
will disappear, but that the various agricultural subsidies will remain
constant in real terms. Housing subsidies are also assumed to remain
constant in real terms. The real standard of provision of war pensions is
assumed constant, which implies that, with the gradual reduction in
the number of recipients, total real expenditure for this purpose will
diminish. National assistance in the form of poor relief of various kinds
is also likely, as assumed, to diminish in size, given constant standards
of service, because of the increasing coverage of the contributory retire-
ment pensions scheme after 1958.
Interpretation and Critique
The projection shows a 6 per cent increase in government expenditure
at 1956 prices over a period of twenty-five years. At first sight, this may
seem a surprisingly siow rate of growth, particularly in view of the fears
often expressed about the potential growth of social service expenditures.
True, the expanding types of expenditure (first group in Table 23) in-
clude such services, and on the assumptions of the projection they would
See A. T. Peacock, "The Future of Government Expenditure," District Bank Review,
June 1955.
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increase by over 20 per cent in real terms over the period. But there
are some forms of social expenditure that the projection shows to remain
constant or to decline. More important, there are other great items of
expenditure that are no more significant in 1981 than in 1956 (third
group in Table 23). Consequently, the overall rate of growth in expendi-
tures is very much less than that of the expanding social services.
We shall later discuss the effects on our projection of some variations
in our operational assumptions. For the moment, let us accept the con-
clusions as realistic and consider what they impiy. For this purpose, we
can adopt the procedure used earlier in the study of comparing the
projected expenditure growth with the growth of GNP.
There is no easy way of assessing the likely size of GNP by 1981, but
it is possible to make calculations of varying degrees of sophistication.
One would be to extrapolate the rate of growth recorded over, say, the
last ten years. At the other extreme, another would be to try to work
out capital-output ratios in a large range of industries, make some
assumption about the rate of capital formation and the growth of the
labor force, and, after prodigious effort, produce the resultant growth
rate. But, whatever degree of sophistication is indulged in, the difficult
has to be faced that the rate of growth of national output is not
independent of the size and character of the public sector. Ideally we
should provide a separate calculation of GNP for each of a series of
projections of public expenditures, based on different answers to the
questions examined earlier. In this way, we could approach the policy
problem by comparison and assessment of the results of these separate
exercises. Such a labor seems hardly worth the effort, in the light of the
conceptual problems in making projections, already discussed, and of
the added difficulties that would arise in making the GNP computation—
including the major difficulty that, while there is certainly likely to be a
relation between the growth of the public sector and the growth of GNP,
we do not know what the relation is nor can we assume that it will not
a period as long as twenty-five years.
Since our object, as already stated, is simply to provide a framework
for policy discussion, to indicate possible future developments, and to
direct attention to the issues that our analysis suggests to be most sig-
nificant for future policy, we have taken the view that a complex pro-
cedure such as the one just described could provide us with more statistics,
but would scarcely make the interpretative problem any easier or more
certain. We have therefore adopted a less elaborate procedure, which
enables the expenditure projection to be interpreted without need for
elaborate calculations about GNP. We ask simply: What rate of increase
of GNP would be necessary to keep the share of government in GNP
constant?
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Given the slow rate of increase of total expenditures indicated by the
projection, the rate of growth of GNP required for the share of govern-
ment to be no larger in 1981 than in 1956 would be modest indeed; and
any larger—and more likely—rate of growth would leave scope for
reducing the relative burden of taxation. A rise in GNP of only 2 per
cent per annum, which is not a fantastic rate of increase on any reasonable
criteria,4 would reduce the percentage of current government expenditure
out of GNP from 33 per cent in 1956 to 21 per cent in
Put in another way, the projection suggests a future degree of scope for
maneuver on the part of the government—whether by way of reduced
tax burdens, acceptance of increased defense commitments, or increases
in the range of public services—much greater than is generally assumed
in current discussion. It remains to be seen whether this conclusion will
need modification in the face of further consideration of the operational
assumptions upon which the projection is based.
The assumption of fixed technical coefficients has already been admitted
to be dubious. This kind of blanket assumption is certainly going to be
wrong in particular instances; for example, it is unlikely that maintaining
given standards in education requires that the number of teachers must
necessarily increase proportionately with the number of pupils, or the
ratio of nurses to patients in hospital. Indivisibilities are bound to be
important in the provision of some services of that kind. Against this, we
have to remember that our projection is restricted to current government
expenditure and therefore is not concerned with expenditure on such
things as school and hospital building or on local authority housing. It
seems reasonable to expect this to make the fixed technical coefficients
assumption less seriously misleading. The fundamental question is whether
the technical conditions of production in the public and private sectors
are likely to change in the next twenty-five years in so drastic a fashion
as to make a projection based on fixed coefficients completely implausible.
From this point of view (and granted that the assumption may be in-
accurate in particular instances), it is still plausible to argue that the
assumption is at least as realistic as any alternative general proposition
about the public sector as a whole.
4Thereare no officially accepted projections of GNP, but the Government Actuary,
for his Report on the Financial Provisions of the Js'ational Insurance Bill, 1959, was asked to
assume an increase in earnings of 2 per cent per annum in making his estimates of future
wage-related contributions and benefits, under the proposed scheme. The report does
not state whether the percentage related to money or real earnings.
5Itis interesting to compare the results of this projection with those of Otto Eckstein
in his Trends in Public Expenditure in the Next Decade, New York, 1959. Using similar
assumptions about political attitudes and the internal situation, he finds that his "med-
ium" projection would result in a rate of growth of federal expenditures of about 2.7 per
cent per annum up to 1968, which would be "less than the expected growth of GNP on
moderate assumptions (3 per cent a year)."
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Such a position is perhaps less tenable when we turn to the related
proposition that the maintenance of real standards in particular social
services can be equated with the maintenance of expenditures per head at
1956 prices. It is particularly so, if we admit the additional problern that
the form of output required to maintain a given standard of health, for
example, must be expected to change over time.
In any case, the whole treatment of standards of service can be objected
to. In the light of our earlier arguments, it is unrealistic to assume that
standards of provision will not change in the next fifteen years. As
suggested in Chapter 2, there is a clear possibility that a rising real
product per head will produce a rise in standards of service, affecting
especially social service spending. This may come about through a
"demonstration effect," operating through a desire to keep standards of
provision in the public sector abreast of economic development in the
private sector.6 To illustrate: if standards of living improve in the private
sector as the real national product rises, then the standards of provision
in hospitals and schools, for example, are bound to be affected. If there
are television sets in the home, there will be strong pressure to have them
in hospitals—as indeed there is now. The gradual widening of the differ-
ential between wage rates and social security benefit rates has brought
with it strong pressure from pensioners and from within the ranks of the
Labour Party to make pensions proportional to income and to link
benefits not only with price changes but also with productivity changes.
Thus, under the National Superannuation Plan sponsored by the Labour
Party, the assumption of a doubling of real national product between
1960 and 1980 would lead to an increase in the pensions bill in real
terms from £775 million to £1 ,700—1,900 million, an increase of two and
one-half times.7 And if retirement pensions rise, unemployment and
sickness benefits, war pensions, and workmen's compensation benefits
cannot be expected to lag far behind. The demonstration effect is all
the more important in Britain toiday because of the size of the welfare
budget within the total of government expenditure. Finally, while the
effect is brought about by taxpayers' comparisons of standards of services
in the private and public sector, it is likely to be supplemented by the
further desire, also discussed in Chapter 2, to improve collective services
6Itis well known that the term demonstration effect was originally applied to the
case of less developed countries, whose consumption standards supposed to be a
function of their contact with Western standards. This effect is supposed to explain the
relatively high marginal propensity to consume of these countries.
"NationalSuperannuation: Labour's Policy for Security in Old Age, 1957. As this passage
was being written the Conservative Government introduced its own plan for wage-
related contributions and benefits for old age, which, if it differs in financial scope from
the Labour party proposals, accepts the same principle. See Ministry of Pensions and
National Insurance, Provision for Old Age, Command Paper No. 538, 1958; and the
National Insurance Bill, 1959.
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such as roads, public health facilities, and so on, as standards of living rise.
To the extent that such an advance in standards should occur, the
projection must give too low a figure for future government expendi-
ture, notably, the 20 per cent increase in the expanding sector would
have to be written up. Such an increase must, of course, reduce the
scope for other measures, involving increased expenditures, if the share
of government in GNP is not to rise, and must reduce the possibilities of
a reduction in the burden of taxation.
There is no way of deciding how important the rises in standards of
services are likely to be, but we can establish their quantitative importance,
and so indicate the range of possibilities, by a fairly simple exercise. Let
us suppose that the standard of provision for the expanding services
grows at the same rate as GNP. Thus if GNP in 1981 were 25 per cent
higher than in 1956, the total expenditure for that group in Table 23
would be 25 per cent higher in 1981 than the figure in the table. This
means an increase of roughly £750 million in those expenditures and in
total government expenditure, and increases the total expenditure index
for 1981 by about 13 per cent. Even on such a pessimistic assumption
about the rate of increase of community output, we find that a rate of
increase of expenditure on expanding services keeping pace with the
increase in GNP still would leave total government expenditure
less quickly than output (19 per cent by 1981 as against the 25 per cent
increase in GNP). If output should increase faster, as seems likely, the
government's scope for increasing itsactivities without increasing its
share of GNP would become greater.
Next we turn to the behavior of population. Keynes once remarked
that population changes were the one thing we could predict with
"reasonable safety."8 It is doubtful if our experiences with population
projections since Keynes wrote on the matter confirms his obiter dictum.
We may be fairly sure that, short of some very large changes in immi-
gration or emigration, our population will age, and to this extent we
may be sure that the scales will be weighted in favor of larger social
expenditures per head, as our projection assumes. However, even in the
course of only six years the highest official estimates of fertility rates
have proved to be too low. In the Report of the Statistics Committee of the
Royal Commission on Population, sixteen projections were made for the
period The highest projected figure for average annual
births was 731,200 per annum for the period 1952—57. The recorded
figure for average annual births for the same period was 838,000. Since
these projections were published, single official projections have begun
8J. M. Keynes, "Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population," Eugenics
Review, April 1937, pp. 13—17.
9Vol.II of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population, H.M.S.O., 1950.
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to appear in the Annual Abstract of Statistics, the first in 1956. The second,
published in 1957, is the one used here; the notes to that projection
table record that the second projection had to be modified to take account
of the maintenance of the unexpectedly high birth rate over the preceding
five years.10 While no one would deny the usefulness of population
projections, it is clear that they are not completely free from uncertainties.
The most we can say is that the population projection we have used is
the most satisfactory one available, and that on present evidence any
change in it is most likely to be in a direction that would increase social
service spending on the young in the intermediate years of our expenditure
forecast. The nature of the changes that could occur before we reached
1981, however, is a good deal less certain.
Conclusion
It has become fashionable to argue that the test of the value of all economic
analysis is its ability to predict accurately. By this test, the purpose of
our survey of the factors governing the growth of public expenditure
should be to find indicators of future trends which can be expressed in
some model of economic growth capable of being tested by econometric
techniques. This is not an argument we accept.
It follows that we would not justify our approach by adopting the
standard defensive reply to the charge that economists cannot predict—
that more refined techniques can be developed, given time. In the
present context it would require the building of models which would
enable us to predict wars, revolutions, and natural disasters. What we
are prepared to say is that the procedure adopted provides a means of
testing the consistency of assumptions made in any attempt to analyze
the future. Moreover, since formulation of any consistent policy by a
government or private economic organization requires forecasting of
future developments, a procedure for this purpose cannot be developed
and understood without knowledge of economic analysis. If all that our
analysis of the evolution of government expenditures teaches us is. that
forecasting is likely to be supremely difficult, that forms a better foun-
dation for judgments about future events than would an oversimplification
of the issues.
However, our study as a whole suggests that we might do more than
this; we hope that the present chapter has indicated some of the possi-
bilities. We believe that the formulation we have used for the examination
of future developments, and the conclusions derived from its use, should
help those concerned with policy to avoid simple (but not uncommon)
errors and to concentrate upon the issues of real importance. This can
10SeeAnnual Abstract of Statistics, No. 94, London, 1957, p.6.
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be demonstrated by summarizing the position to which our projection
and comment upon it has brought us, and by relating this to the earlier
discussion (Chapter 5) of the evolution and present position of the control
of public expenditures in Britain. The two together throw an interesting
light on the problems of present-day expenditure policy, and upon the
difficulties and scope of action of the Plowden Committee, which has
been set up to make recommendations upon the Parliamentary control
of expenditure.
The projection indicates the possibility of considerable growth in some
types of expenditure (notably on social services) by 1981, given present
standards of provision. Nevertheless, the importance of the contracting
and stationary groups of expenditure is great enough to make this growth
compatible with a much slower overall rate of growth in government
expenditure. With any reasonable rate of increase of community output,
that is, the overall rate of growth in expenditures might be expected to
be compatible with either a reduction of the share of GNP taken by
government or an increase in the scope of government activities without
need to increase that share.If it is thought that standards of provision
must increase, the "elbow room" is of course reduced, but our projection
suggests that a rate of growth of expanding services as fast as the rate
of growth of GNP would not remove all freedom of maneuver, even for
a rate of increase of GNP as low as1 per cent per annum. For faster
(more likely?) rates of economic growth, the scope for a growing public
sector would be correspondingly larger.Further, that scope seems
adequate to meet foreseeable demands for increases in the range and
standard of public provision. Although much can happen in twenty-five
years, there is no present reason to expect (in the absence of social
disturbances) the sort ol rapid changes that, for example, produced a
50 per cent rise in the share of government in GNP between 1890 and
1910.11 Failing radical changes in social ideas or technological require-
ments in the near future, it seems that demands for improved standards
of provision, and so forth, may be well within the limits imposed by the
burden of taxation which we have to accept.
These results are, of course, subject to the views we have taken about
technical coefficients and about population change, and to the absence
of social disturbances during the period under survey. As to the first two
of these, we believe that our discussion indicates that the margin of error
to which our assumptions leave us vulnerable is not such as to affect our
11Thatperiod not only differed from the present in social climate (it was a period of
growing acceptance of the need for policies requiring increased public expenditures)
and in the much smaller share of GNP being taken by government; it was also affected
by the South African War, which, while less far-reaching in its effects than the later
world wars, must have eased the process of change and probably facilitated a rate of
growth more rapid than would otherwise have been possible.
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conclusionssubstantially.Socialdisturbancesare assumed absent;
the possible consequences for our argument should such disturbances
occur will be discussed below.
Our projection invites the conclusion, then, that the scope for expansion
of government expenditures in Britain in the next quarter-century may
be much greater than is generally believed.Certainly, we are led to
question the realism of the view that government revenues and expen-
ditures have now reached some critical limit beyond which it would be
impossible, or at best foolish, to go. But this does not imply that we our-
selves are content with a situation in which the government continues
to utilize (directly) a quarter of the national product, or that the com-
munity at large will wish it to do so. We have not demonstrated that
expenditures must increase at the same rate as GNP, but only the scope
for public activity that such a ("tolerable") rate of increase would provide.
It remains to ask: Why should we not expect the future to bring a reduc-
tion in the burden of taxation rather than an increase in the extent and
standards of public provision? This is not, of course, a question to which
our projection provides an answer of itself; but considered along with the
rest of our study, it provides a useful basis for "informed speculation."
Certainly, there is much concern about the present size of public
expenditures; this is demonstrated, inter alia, by the very appointment
of the Plowden Committee. There is a considerable body of opinion,
for example, supporting the view that the income-leveling effects of
progressive taxation produced much more severe disincentive effects
after 1945 than after 1918, and that these effects still continue.Also,
opposition already exists to that "cult of welfare" which was so important
a part of the displacement effect during the Second World War, and there
are signs that this opposition is growing in importance and influence.
Nevertheless, it seems to us likely that the growth of public expenditures
will continue to be restricted by existing notions of what is tolerable
rather than by deliberate attempts to reduce (or check the rate of growth
of) the public sector. There is in the first place no general agreement
as to the desirability of such deliberate restriction. The Labour Party
in particular is committed, if returned to power, to schemes that must
surely make for a rate of growth of spending as rapid as the community
will accept—including a great increase in government aid to under-
developed countries. The Conservative Party, though more concerned
about the size of public spending, has not proposed a radical reduction
in spending on any major service, and has plans that would require
increased spending in particular directions. At best, they would probably
be content with an overall rate of growth of spending that involved
no major changes in tax rates. These arguments about current attitudes
are reinforced by the conclusions reached by our earlier historical survey.
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Concern about public expenditures is not new, nor isthe Plowden
Committee the first one to consider the matter.Neither the concern
nor the earlier committees seem to have had any lasting effect on the
growth of public spending. Furthermore, the practical problems of ex-
penditure control are now more difficult than ever before in British
history; we explained in Chapter 5 that the authority of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer in expenditure matters has declined with the decline
in agreement as to the economic rationale of public spending. Without
agreement on objectives, Parliamentary control seems bound to be
ineffective.At the same time, even simple control over the efficiency
of public spending has become more and more difficult: the Treasury's
task in "the saving of candle ends" has become a matter of keeping
check upon expenditure on great projects of uncertain cost and length
of life.
We would conclude, therefore, that the rate of growth of public
expenditures is likely to be such as at least to maintain the share of
government in ON? broadly at present levels.If the Plowden Com-
mittee can find ways to improve "the saving of candle ends," it will have
achieved a notable public service; if it can find means, in existing British
conditions, to restore or replace the former broad authority over ex-
penditure policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury,
it will have achieved a miracle. Failing such a miracle, we must expect
the opportunities for change that a rising GNP must bring to result in a
growing public sector rather than a declining tax burden. Nor would we
expect this conclusion to be changed by the occurrence during the period
under examination of an important social disturbance (such as a major
war or a runaway inflation). Failing some great change in social attitudes
and institutions, the arguments adduced above also provide support
for the view that any displacement effect of such a disruption would most
likely be upward, and there is certainly no sign at present that the burden
of taxation itself is likely to lead to revolution!
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